Kein Wunder, das was wir schon lange vermutet haben und oft hier auch geschrieben haben, wird hier knallhart ausgesprochen.

Unter diesen Prämissen kann man viele Dinge verstehen, zum Beispiel daß sich die Franzosen via ihrer Marionette Tom Enders als CEO von EADS zum Beispiel die gesamte Flugzeug- und Raumfahrtindustrie an die Franzosen verkloppt haben. Was einst in Ottobrunn, Manching, Schrobenhausen, Friedrichshafen etc. angesiedelt war, ist jetzt unter französischer Besatzerknute. Man muß nur einmal bei den Kollegen am Bodensee nachfragen...

Kein Wunder, daß wir auch mittels Propagandaposaunen, via Verdünnung und Umvolkung und via permanentem Aufrühren von politischem Streit (Klimareligion, Mohammedaner Welcome!) und via Marionetten a la Merz, die "Brandmauern" errichten, obwohl sich fast 60% unserer Bürger längst eine konservative Regierung und die Lösung der islamistischen Zuwanderungskrise wünschen, klein und niedrig gehalten werden sollen. Nimmt man noch Schlüsselfehler wie Mehdorn und die Bahnprivatisierung sowie Bulmahn und Schleicher mit der Zerstörung des besten Bildungssystems dazu, kann man verstehen, wie die Besatzer mittels weniger Marionetten und Stellschrauben unser Land klein gehalten haben.

https://www.belfercenter.org/programs/thucydidess-trap/thucydidess-trap-case-file

16. 1990s-present — United Kingdom and France vs. Germany — NO WAR
Period: 1990s-present
Ruling power: United Kingdom and France
Rising power: Germany
Domain: Political influence in Europe
Outcome: No war

At the conclusion of the Cold War, many expected that a newly reunified Germany would regress to its old hegemonic ambitions. While they were right that Germany was destined for a return to political and economic might in Europe, its rise has remained largely benign. An awareness of how Thucydides’s Trap has ensnared their country in the past has led German leaders to find a new way to exert power and influence: by leading an integrated economic order, rather than by military dominance.

When West German chancellor Helmut Kohl broached the question of German reunification at the conclusion of the Cold War, leaders of Europe’s status quo powers — the UK and France — balked at the prospect of a newly powerful Germany. For many strategists, the division of Germany at the end of World War II was the enduring solution to the “German problem” that had been at the root of two world wars. NATO’s triple mission for Europe, went an oft-repeated quip, was “to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”159

Britain’s and France’s anxieties were easy to understand: a reunified Germany would be Western Europe’s most populous country and an economic powerhouse. Along these lines, the French ambassador to Germany argued in 1989 that reunification “would give birth to a Europe dominated by Germany, which no one, in the East or West, wants.”160 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took these concerns even further, privately telling President George H. W. Bush of her fear that “the Germans will get in peace what Hitler could not get in war.”161 To counter this perceived threat, Thatcher and President François Mitterrand discussed strengthening the alliance between Britain and France. Mitterrand, for example, contemplated “bilateral military and even nuclear cooperation with Britain as a counterbalance.”162 According to former diplomat and scholar Philip Zelikow and former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, “Europeans, particularly the French, believed that any revival of German power had to go hand in hand with European structures that would keep the German state from endangering France.”163

As the European leaders foresaw, Germany indeed was able to leverage its economic strength into a position as Europe’s strongest political voice, filling the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Remarkably, however, this reemergence has so far occurred peacefully. It has also occurred, over time, with British and French support. So how did it happen that, as Henry Kissinger recently observed, “seventy years after having defeated German claims to dominating Europe, the victors are now pleading, largely for economic reasons, with Germany to lead Europe”?164

Germany’s peaceful rise is mostly due to its broad strategy of assuaging European suspicions through open gestures of good faith and seeking interdependence with its former adversaries. Most importantly, German leaders consciously chose not to redevelop a military presence commensurate with the nation’s economic power.

This new path became especially apparent as Germany achieved economic hegemony, becoming a dominant player in Europe’s integrated markets and leader of the Frankfurt-based European Central Bank. As former British trade minister Stephen Green notes, Germany channeled its power mainly into influencing Europe’s political economy: “In no sense has Germany shown any readiness to play any strategic role in the world of foreign affairs of the kind both the British and the French have taken for granted.”165 A strategy of integration, as international relations scholar Helga Haftendorn describes it, “was to compensate for Germany’s gains in power and sovereignty by emphasizing the importance of integrating this potential into a new Europe, creating a ‘Europeanized Germany’ rather than a ‘German Europe.’”166

It is important to note, of course, that Germany’s pursuit of economic integration began prior to reunification.167 Furthermore, Germany’s decision to forgo a military expansion to match its economic clout was undoubtedly influenced by America’s presence as a regional security guarantor and stabilizing force in Europe. Whatever its origins, though, Germany’s approach ultimately proved reassuring to its former foes, demonstrating a new ethos characterized by policy analyst Hans Kundnani in The Paradox of German Power as “a strange mixture of economic assertiveness and military abstinence . . . In geopolitical terms, Germany is benign.”168

Recently, instability caused by the fallout from the global financial crisis and an overwhelming surge of immigrants and refugees from Syria and the Middle East have called the existing European system — and German leadership — into question. Regardless of Europe’s future, however, or the historically unusual circumstances of America’s security presence on the Continent, Germany’s approach at the critical moment of power transition provides enduring and important lessons for powers seeking to avoid Thucydides’s Trap. Germany has learned that increasing defense spending to match economic development can easily beget conflict, and that continual gestures of goodwill are needed to overcome deep-seated fear between rival nations. Through stability, openness, integration with former adversaries, and a willingness to forgo more traditional shows of power, Germany has managed thus far to escape Thucydides’s Trap.